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Information, Impact, Ignorance, Illegality, Investing, and Inequality
Bruce Knuteson
We note a simple mechanism that may at least partially resolve several outstanding economic
puzzles, including why the cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio of the S&P 500 index has been
oddly high for the past two decades, why gains to capital have outpaced gains to wages, and the
persistence of the equity premium.
I. INFORMATION AND IMPACT
In United States equity markets, bid-ask spreads early
in the trading day are typically larger than spreads later
in the trading day [1] [7]. The price impact of aggressive
trades early in the trading day is therefore typically larger
than the price impact of equally sized aggressive trades
later in the day [2].
Market makers make wider markets early in the trad-
ing day. The market, viewed as an information aggrega-
tor, respects the information content of aggressive orders
early in the day more than the information content of
equally sized aggressive orders later in the day [2].
A repeated sequence of intraday round trips – e.g., buy-
ing in the morning and selling in the afternoon, repeated
over many days – can therefore be expected to result in
net price impact in the direction of the morning trade.
II. IGNORANCE
If some market participant (M) performs the same
round trip each day – e.g., aggressively buying in the
morning and selling in the afternoon – M ’s trading will,
on average, nudge the market’s midprice in the direction
of his morning trading.
If M has a large, slowly varying portfolio, the mark
to market gains resulting from M ’s daily intraday round
trip trades can exceed the cost M incurs by crossing the
spread twice each day.
Putting in some round numbers, supposeM has $1B in
capital levered 10 times for a total equity book of $10B.
Further supposeM aggressively trades $10M in the direc-
tion of his portfolio in the morning, crossing a typical full
spread of 15 bps in many stocks, and then trades $10M
in the opposite direction at the end of the day, crossing
a typical full spread of 5 bps. M ’s expected daily trad-
ing cost (∼$10K) is significantly less than the expected
mark to market gain on M ’s portfolio from M ’s trad-
ing (∼$1M) [8]. The two orders of magnitude separating
these numbers leaves plenty of room for a more careful
analysis to produce a qualitatively similar conclusion: M
can systematically mark up his existing book by trading
in the direction of his book early in the trading day and
trading in the opposite direction later in the day.
The two orders of magnitude separating these numbers
also leaves plenty of room forM to be sloppy in his execu-
tion of this strategy. One can imagineM stumbling upon
this trading style – tending to expand his portfolio in the
morning and contracting it in the afternoon – without
fully grasping its consequences; chalking his profits up to
his cleverness in identifying market patterns; and either
missing or choosing to ignore signs he is blowing his own
bubble. The self delusion is even easier if there are a few
such Ms, sheepishly tending to hold similar portfolios,
and inadvertently sharing the trading costs of marking
up all of their books.
How long could this persist? M ’s investors and on-
lookers, seeing impressive returns and not understanding
the mechanism by which they have been generated, are
more likely to entrust M with additional capital than to
complain. An average daily nudge of 4 bps takes seven
years to push prices by a factor of two. M ’s charade
can therefore plausibly last the better part of a decade
. . . and possibly longer, if other, fortuitous bets let M
wriggle out of a blowup or two.
III. ILLEGALITY
M ’s actions are of course illegal if M is aware of what
he is doing, or if M reasonably should be aware of what
he is doing but chooses to be willfully blind.
IV. INVESTING
In light of the above, it is striking that the returns to
the S&P 500 index over the fifteen years spanning 1993
to 2007, inclusive, all came at the start of the trading
day [3].
Indeed, Figure 1 of Ref. [3] is so striking it calls for
a simple explanation. We propose such an explanation.
We propose some market participantM , tending to trade
in one direction early in the trading day and in the other
direction later in the day, has had a much larger long-
term effect on United States equity prices than has so far
been widely appreciated [9].
This testable proposal provides a candidate solution
to several outstanding economic puzzles. Why has the
cyclically adjusted price to earnings ratio of the S&P 500
index been oddly high for the past two decades [4]? Why
have gains to capital outpaced gains to wages [5]? Why
has the equity premium [6] persisted? The solution to all
of these puzzles may lie in the systematic pattern of intra-
day trading of one or more specific market participants
that have ratcheted equity prices to unreasonable levels
over the course of the past two to three decades [10].
2V. INEQUALITY
The fact that gains to capital have outpaced gains to
wages has been identified as an important contributor
to recent increased wealth inequality [5]. This wealth
inequality could arise in significant part simply from M ’s
trading.
VI. SUMMARY
We certainly hope the speculation in this article turns
out to be wrong. It would be an embarrassing shame if
current prices of publicly traded companies were largely
an unintended side effect of a few market participants,
trading systematically in roughly the same way, day af-
ter day, for years. It would be even worse if that trading
turned out to be initiated by computer algorithms, which
are very good at doing things consistently, day after day,
for years. It would be worse still if those computer algo-
rithms were written by people with next to no knowledge
of the companies being traded. It would be an extraordi-
nary tragedy if this has artificially contributed to undue
inequality within and between nations; if the resulting
aberrant price signals have encouraged millions of indi-
viduals to make imprudent decisions regarding their ca-
reers, retirement, and savings; and if the stories we have
told ourselves to explain suspiciously high equity prices
over the past few years have all glibly omitted the most
important player(s).
For all of these reasons, the speculation in this article
must surely be wrong. It is inconceivable that regula-
tors could have missed such an obvious pattern in United
States equity markets for a full quarter century. Even if
they had, surely someone would have noticed and alerted
them, and surely they would then have taken prompt and
effective action. There is no way a nation of three hun-
dred million intelligent people could have let a few market
participants produce three consecutive equity bubbles in
the space of two decades. It is ridiculous to think we
could have misinterpreted the consistent actions of a few
market participants as an indication of America’s recov-
ering economic strength following the financial crisis of
2008. With so many pundits commenting continuously
on the stock market, it stretches imagination to believe
all of those bright, articulate people and their staffs could
have missed something so basic. The idea that ten tril-
lion dollars of illusory equity value might have been cre-
ated by the trading of a few market participants over the
span of two decades is obviously, completely, utterly, and
ridiculously absurd.
Then again, maybe somebody should check.
Just in case.
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